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Abstract
Massive MIMO is one of the salient techniques for achieving high spectral efficiency in next
generation wireless networks. Recently, a combined strategy of the massive MIMO and the artificial
noise (AN), namely, AN assisted massive MIMO (ANAM) has recently been actively investigated for
security enhancement. However, most of previous studies on the ANAM have been built upon the full
channel state information (CSI) assumption at the eavesdropper (ED), which may be too pessimistic to
provide meaningful information on the security since the channel uncertainty of the ED may degrade
its decoding ability. In this paper, we provide more sophisticated investigation on the performance of
the ANAM system assuming that the CSI of the ED channels are unknown to both the BS and the ED
or partially known to the ED. We measure the secrecy in terms of both the leakage rate to the ED and
the secrecy rate to the legitimate users, and characterize their upper and lower bounds in the high SNR
regime as a function of the number of ED antennas, the number of data and AN signal dimensions,
and coherence time. Finally, from numerical results, we demonstrate the accuracy of our analysis and
highlight the security potential of the ANAM system against the passive eavesdropping attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the growing prevalence of wireless radio technologies, the security has become a
major social challenge for both personal and professional sphere. Unlike the wired communica-
tions, however, the wireless security is in general a challenging task, since the radio transmission
has no physical boundary, and thus any receivers nearby can listen to the transmitted signals.
As the wireless link is also unreliable and severely constrained by energy and bandwidth, more
sophisticated physical layer designs are required. An important objective of the physical layer
wireless security is to protect such an radio interface by negligibly low probability of interception
(LPI) without relying on (but can be integrated with) the upper-layer crypto system.
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2Several classical solutions have already existed to achieve the LPI. For example, a waveform
can be designed at the base-station (BS) using furtive frequency/time hopped or spread spectrum
signals [1]. However, it may not be secure enough in wideband systems due to reduced space for
the spreading gain. If the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper (ED) is allowed
at the BS, we may apply the directional beamforming scheme so that the data signals do not
appear at the ED. However, it is difficult to achieve in practice because the EDs are typically
passive so as to hide their existence.
To address such issues, there are several of LPI designs that do not rely on both the ED’s CSI
at the BS. One is to broadcast artificial noise (AN) signals isotropically within the null space
of the legitimate receiver (LU) channels [2]–[6]. Another way is to utilize a large excess of BS
antennas as in [7], in which the channel hardening effect automatically arises rendering stable
and predictable channel condition to the LUs, while nearly nullified channel gains to the ED. In
addition, a combined strategy of the massive MIMO and the AN, namely, AN assisted massive
MIMO (ANAM) has recently been actively investigated for security enhancement [8] [9].
As for the CSI acquisition in the massive MIMO systems, the time division duplexing (TDD)
mode, in which the channel reciprocity is exploited to allow the BS to obtain CSI through uplink
channel training, is in general a better choice than the frequency division duplexing (FDD) mode.
This is because the downlink training in FDD yields prohibitively large overhead as the number
of BS antennas increases [10].
In fact, no downlink training yields an advantage in terms of the security, because the coherent
detection is not allowed at the ED. Unlike the LUs that can enjoy the deterministic channel
condition via the beamforming from the BS, the best strategy that can be taken by the ED to
intercept the messages is the blind estimation (or detection) schemes [11] [12] whose performance
is heavily dependent on the coherence time and dimensionality of the signal space. Thus, it is
expected that as the coherence time of the ED channel reduces or the number of BS antennas
increases, the security will be enhanced. Nevertheless, most of current research on the ANAM
has been built upon the full CSI assumption at the ED, which gives rises to more pessimistic
results than it actually is, and thus could be misleading.
In this paper, we provide more sophisticated investigation on the performance of the TDD-
based ANAM systems with the non-coherent passive ED in block fading, where the CSI of
the ED channels are unknown to both the BS and the ED. The goal of the paper is to find an
analytic expression of the leakage rate that measures the amount of information leaked to the
3non-coherent ED. Note that once the leakage rate is identified, the secrecy rate can be easily
computed, which represents the maximum secure data rate to the LUs with the aid of the wiretap
codes [13] [14]. Similar security concepts of no downlink training have been developed for the
artificial fast fading (AFF) schemes in [15]–[18], but the analysis has been based on the full
CSI assumption at the ED. The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows.
• First, in Section IV, we analyze the leakage rate to the non-coherent ED, namely, ‘non-
coherent leakage rate’ based on the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) approximation. Our
analysis not only unveils the degrees of freedom (DoF) of the leakage rate, but also identifies
upper and lower bounds of the constant terms that are irrespective of ED’s SNR. The bounds
become tight as the coherence time increases over the number of BS antennas. Interestingly,
we observe that when we scale up the dimensionality of the signal and AN space to the
level of coherence time, the leakage rate DoF converges to zero regardless of the number
of ED antennas and even without the aid of the wiretap codes. Obviously, this is not the
case for the coherent ED [3]. Note that our analysis is different from the previous works for
non-coherent MIMO capacity in [19]–[21] because the artificial noise has not been taken
into account, which makes the problem more challenging.
• Next, in Section V, we examine ‘partially coherent leakage rate’ considering a situation
where the BS uses a downlink training over a few of beamforming vectors like the beam-
formed CSI-RS in LTE-A [22]. The situation may occur when the CSIs at the BS is imperfect
or outdated so that the LUs need to estimate their effective channels more accurately. In
this case, the ED may also overhear the training signals and perform the coherent detection.
Nevertheless, the channel uncertainty still remains since the AN channels are still unknown.
The leakage rate is investigated in terms of both a universal upperbound that holds for all
SNRs, and the tight upper and lower bounds that hold at high SNR. It turns out that the
universal bound is tight in the low SNR regime regardless of the coherence time, while a
relatively long coherence time is needed for the tightness of the high SNR bounds.
• In Section VI, we provide useful insights into the design through in-depth discussion on
the analytical performance of the ANAM systems. Specifically, we examine the required
number of BS antennas for the zero-DoF leakage rate according to the coherence time of
the ED channels, the artificial fast fading design that deliberately shortens the ED’s channel
coherence time, and the achievable secrecy-rate to the LUs considering the wiretap codes at
4the BS. Finally, in VII, we present extensive simulation results to confirm the accuracy of our
analysis and demonstrate the robustness of the ANAM system to the passive eavesdropping
attack.
Notations: Normal letters represent scalar quantities, boldface letters indicate vectors and
boldface uppercase letters designate matrices. The superscripts (·)T, (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the
transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose operations, and C and R+ denote sets of complex
and real positive numbers, respectively. We denote by IN an N × N identity matrix and by
E[·] the expectation. We write Tr (A) and det(A) for the trace and determinant of a matrix A,
respectively. We use (·)+ and I(x; y) to denote max(·, 0) and the mutual information between
two random variables x and y, respectively. We write h(·) as differential entropy to the base 2.
The equivalence
d
= means the same distribution.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a multiuser downlink system where a BS having a large M number
of antennas supports K LUs with a single antenna in the presence of an ED with NE antennas.
Note that the multi-antenna ED can be interpreted as multiple cooperative EDs with a total of
NE antennas. Similarly, the proposed analytical results are generally applicable to the case of
a single LU with K antennas. We adopt a Rayleigh flat fading model in which the baseband
channels from the BS to the k-th LU and ED are respectively expressed by hHk ∈ C1×M and
G ∈ CNE×M whose propagation coefficients are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., CN (0, 1). We consider the block-
fading where all channel coefficients remain constant for T symbol periods, and change to new
independent values in the next time period.
The BS operates in a TDD mode and has perfect knowledge of H = [h1, . . . ,hK ]
H utilizing
the uplink training from the LUs and the channel reciprocity. Meanwhile, the instantaneous CSIs
of the ED channel G is completely unknown to the BS due to the passive eavesdropping of the
ED, although its statistical information may be known to the BS.1 The BS basically transmits no
downlink training in order to prevent the ED from coherent detection, which means that the CSI
is unavailable at both the LUs and the ED.2 As in the conventional massive MIMO, the system
1 Recent advances in physical layer security have shown that it is actually possible for the BS to estimate the geometrical or
stochastic information of the ED channels, even if the ED operates in a passive mode via detecting the inevitable power leakage
of the ED’s local oscillator [23] or utilizing the torch aided methods in [24].
2Note that the case of partially coherent ED will also be covered later in Section V.
5is designed such that M is much greater than K. In contrast, NE could be arbitrarily large to
be compared with M , given the situation where several multi-antenna EDs can cooperate. For
simplicity, we consider homogeneous users, i.e., each LU experiences the same received signal
power on average and ignore the uplink phase duration in the coherence time T .
As we have assumed that M ≫ K, the extra antenna dimension at the BS can be exploited
for AN transmission to interfere with the EDs. Specifically, during each coherence interval, the
BS generates and transmits an M × T dimensional signal matrix X ∈ CM×T as
X = αH†S+ βVH2,NJN, (1)
where S , [s1, . . . , sK ]
H ∈ CK×T denotes the message signals whose k-th row sHk ∈ C1×T
carries a message to the k-th LU, H† ,
√
MHH(HHH)−1 refers to the pseudo-inverse of H,
and N ∈ CNJ×T contains the NJ dimensional artificial jamming noise with NJ ≤ M − K.
Here, VH2,NJ ∈ CM×NJ represents an orthonormal matrix with VHH2,NJVH2,NJ = INJ and
HVH2,NJ = 0, which is attainable from the following singular value decomposition (SVD)
H = UH [ ΛH 0 ]V
H
H , (2)
where UH ∈ CK×K and VH , [VH1 VH2] ∈ CM×M denote unitary matrices with VH1 ∈ CM×K
and VH2 ∈ CM×(M−K), and ΛH ∈ CK×K refers to a diagonal matrix having non-zero singular
values. Then, VH2,NJ in (1) is defined by the first NJ columns of VH2 . It is seen that in each
symbol time, the BS can transmit at most M −K dimensional AN signals isotropically in the
null subspace of the main channel H.
It is assumed that S and N have i.i.d. Gaussian entries sij ∼ CN (0, 1) and nij ∼ CN (0, 1),
respectively to maximize the information rate to the LUs while minimizing the leakage rate to
the ED for a given S. The scaling factors α ∈ R+ and β ∈ R+ distribute the power to the
message and AN signals, subject to a power constraint Tr(E[XXH]) = MT where
Tr
(
E[XXH]
)
= TMα2E
[
Tr
(
(HHH)−1
)]
+ β2NJT,
=
MK
M −Kα
2 +NJβ
2. (3)
The last equality follows from E[(HHH)−1] = 1
M−K IK [25]. The values of α and β are fixed
over a codeword duration, and therefore assumed to be known to all nodes.
After the signal in (1) is transmitted, corresponding received signals at the k-th LU and ED
6can be respectively expressed by
yHk = α
√
MsHk +w
H
k (4)
and YE = G1S+G2N+ Z, (5)
where wHk ∈ C1×T and Z ∈ CNE×T denote the Gaussian thermal noise having i.i.d entries
wkj ∼ CN (0, σ2w) and zij ∼ CN (0, σ2z), respectively. Also, we define G1 , αGH† ∈ CNE×K
andG2 , βGV¯H,NJ ∈ CNE×NJ as the effective channels of the ED. We refer to SNRL = 1σ2w and
SNRE =
1
σ2z
as the expected SNRs at each receive antenna of the LUs and the ED, respectively.
In our system, the channel coding can be applied over multiple n fading blocks. We do not
assume any wiretap codes until we discuss the secrecy rate. The encoding function is thus a one-
to-one mapping between the messages and the codewords. Let us define Mk = {1, . . . , 2nTRk}
as a message set for the k-th LU with a transmission rate Rk. Then, the secrecy can be measured
in terms of a mutual information I(M1, . . . ,MK ;Y(n)E ) = I(S(n);Y(n)E ) which measures the
amount of information leaked to the ED.
Because of the independence among different coherence intervals, it is sufficient to study one
coherence interval. Therefore, equivalently we can measure the secrecy via leakage rate that is
defined by
Lnoncoherent(K,NE, NJ , T ) = 1
T
I(YE;S). (6)
In this paper, we call (6) non-coherent leakage rate, because neither the BS nor the ED knows
the CSIs of both G1 and G2.
The exact values of the leakage information can be formulated as
I(S;YE) = h(YE)− h(YE |S)
= E
[
log
P (YE|S)
P (YE)
]
=
∫
dSP (S)
∫
dYEP (YE|S) log
{
P (YE|S)∫
dS′P (S′)P (YE|S′)
}
=
∫
dSP (S)
∫
dYE
∫
dN′P (N′)P (YE|S,N′)
× log
{ ∫
dN′P (N′)P (YE|S,N′)∫
dS′P (S′)
∫
dN′P (N′)P (YE|S′,N′)
}
. (7)
A direct evaluation of the mutual information in (7) is prohibitive even if the numerical methods
7are utilized, because the exact distribution of P (YE|S,N) is unknown and a myriad of integrals
over multi-dimensional complex space are computationally intractable whenever the number of
components of the signal matrices S and N are much greater than one in the massive MIMO
systems. The goal of the paper is to find an analytic expression of the leakage-rate, which enables
us to evaluate the leakage rate without computing (7) for many cases of interest in the ANAM
systems.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some useful results and approximations that will be used for our
mathematical derivations throughout the paper.
A. Ergodic leakage rate
Supposing that the effective ED channels G1 and G2 are perfectly known to the ED (but not
at the BS), the ergodic secrecy capacity was investigated in [26]. In the following lemma, we
reinterpret some of the results in terms of the leakage rate considering the i.i.d. Gaussian input
and AN signals.
Lemma 1 (Ergodic Leakage Rate): For the given knowledge on G¯ , [G1 G2] ∈ CNE×M¯
with M¯ = NJ + K, YE is Gaussian. Thus, the ergodic leakage rate can be computed and
approximated at high SNRE as
Lergodic(K,NE, NJ) , 1
T
I(YE ;S|G¯)
= E
[
log det
(
G¯G¯H + σ2zINE
)− log det (G2GH2 + σ2zINE) ] (8)
σ2z→0= min((NE −NJ)+, K) log SNRE + cK,NE,NJ ,ergodic + o(1)
where o(1) represents the vanishing terms as σ2z → 0 and cK,NE ,NJ ,ergodic denote a constant value
irrespective of σ2z , which is defined by
cK,NE,NJ ,ergodic = E
[min(M¯,NE)∑
i=1
log λ2G¯,i −
min(NE ,NJ )∑
i=1
log λ2G2,i
]
with λG¯,i for i = 1, . . . ,min(M¯,NE) and λG2,j for j = 1, . . . ,min(NE, NJ) being the non-zero
singular values of G¯ and G2, respectively.
8Proof: By applying the SVD to G¯ and G2 in (8), we have
I(YE;S|G¯) = TE
[
NE∑
i=1
log(λ2G¯,i + σ
2
z)−
NE∑
i=1
log(λ2G2,i + σ
2
z)
]
= −T min((NE −NJ)+, K) log σ2z
+TE

min(M¯ ,NE)∑
i=1
log(λ2G¯,i + σ
2
z)−
min(NE ,NJ)∑
i=1
log(λ2G2,i + σ
2
z)


Finally, we obtain the lemma for σ2z → 0.
We first find from Lemma 1 that the ergodic leakage rate has a DoF min((NE − NJ)+, K),
which means that the amount of information leaked to the coherent ED increases by min((NE−
NJ)
+, K) bps/Hz for each 3dB SNRE increase. If NE ≤ NJ , the DoF converges to zero, since
all spatial dimension of the ED is corrupted by the AN. In this case, thus, the leakage rate will
be saturated at high SNR. In contrast, when the ED has a sufficiently large number of antennas
such that NE > M¯ , the DoF increases up to K. Therefore, when the CSI is allowed at the ED,
a number of ED antennas could be a serious security threat despite the assistance of the AN.
B. Large system approximation
In this subsection, we examine the distributions of effective ED channels G1 and G2 in (5).
Property 1: The entries of G2 are i.i.d. CN (0, β2) and independent of G1.
Proof: The ED channel G is isotropically distributed (i.d.), since its distribution is invariant
under rotation. Thus, for an M ×M unitary matrix VH = [VH1 VH2 ], the entries of βGVH
are still i.i.d. CN (0, β2), which implies that G2 = βGVH2,NJ has also i.i.d. CN (0, β2) entries
and is independent of GVH1 . Now, by applying the SVD in (2) to G1, we have an equality
G1 = αGVH1Λ
−1
H U
H
H . Since G2 is independent of GVH1 (the first half of G1), the remaining
problem is to show that G2 is also independent of Λ
−1
H U
H
H . This can be easily proved because
G is independent of both ΛH and UH , and VH2,NJ is i.d. in the Stiefel manifold for any given
ΛH and UH . Thus, G2 is independent of G1.
Property 2: The entries of G1 are approximated to i.i.d. CN (0, α2) as MK →∞.
Proof: By the law of large numbers, we have limM
K
→∞
1
M
HHH = IK , which implies that
1√
M
ΛH
M/K→∞
= IK and G1
M/K→∞
= αGVH1U
H
H
d
= αGVH1 , and the proof is concluded.
Figure 1 demonstrates our statement in Property 2. We confirm from the figure that as M
K
increases, each element ofG1 gets close to the corresponding Gaussian distribution. It is observed
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Fig. 1. Probability density function (PDF) for the (1, 1)-th real component of G1 with α = 1.
that only a small value of M
K
, e.g., 4 or more, is sufficient for the approximation.
Now, from the large system approximation, i.e., 1
M
HHH
M/K→∞
= IK , the power constraint in
(3) asymptotically equal to
α2K + β2NJ = M. (9)
From now on, we consider (9) when we determine the power distribution factors α and β.
C. Mathematical definitions
In what follows, we briefly introduce some mathematical definitions that will be used through-
out the paper.
Definition 1 (Stiefel Manifold [27]): The Stiefel manifold S(T,M) for T ≥ M is defined
as the set of all unitary M × T matrices S(T,M) = {U ∈ CM×T |UUH = IM} and the total
volume of the Stiefel manifold is computed as
|S(T,M)| =
T∏
i=T−M+1
2pii
(i− 1)! .
Definition 2 (Grassmann Manifold [27]): The Grassmann manifold G(T,M) for T ≥ M
is defined as the quotient space of S(T,M), which represents the set of all M-dimensional
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subspaces of CT . The volume of the Grassmann manifold equals
|G(T,M)| = |S(T,M)||S(M,M)| =
∏T
i=T−M+1
2pii
(i−1)!∏M
i=1
2pii
(i−1)!
.
Definition 3 (Digamma Function [28]): In mathematics, the digamma function ϕ(x) , d
dx
ln Γ(x)
is defined as the logarithmic derivative of the gamma function Γ(x) ,
∫∞
0
zx−1e−zdz. Then, for
a random Gaussian matrix S ∈ CM×T whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, 1) for T ≥M , the following
equivalence holds:
E[log det(SSH)] = log e
M∑
i=1
E[ln ΓT−i+1,1] = log e
M∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1), (10)
where Γ(k,θ) denotes the gamma random variable with shape and scale parameters k and θ,
respectively, and the last equality is due to the equivalence E[ln Γk,θ] = ϕ(k) − ln θ. For an
integer x, ϕ(x) can be computed as ϕ(x) = −γ +∑x−1p=1 1p where γ ≃ 0.57721566 is Euler’s
constant. The result in (10) will be periodically utilized throughout the paper.
IV. NON-COHERENT LEAKAGE RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate high SNR approximate to the non-coherent leakage rate in (6).
Throughout the section, we assume that T ≥ M¯ and the ED channels are unknown to both the
ED and the BS. First, to compute h(YE), we observe that YE in (5) can be rephrased by
YE = G¯X¯+ Z (11)
where X¯ , [ST NT]T corresponds to a virtual input signal having i.i.d. CN (0, 1) entries and the
effective ED channels G¯ = [G1 G2] is unknown to anybody. Then, h(YE) can be computed as
in the following theorem.
Proposition 1: For T ≥ M¯ , h(YE) can be computed at high SNRE (σ2z → 0) as
h(YE) = h(GˆΛX¯Q) + (T − M¯)E

min(M¯,NE)∑
i=1
log λ2G¯X¯,i

+ log ∣∣G(T,min(M¯,NE))∣∣∣∣G(max(M¯,NE), NE)∣∣
+(NE − M¯)+(T − M¯) log pieσ2z + o(1), (12)
where Gˆ , G¯UX¯ with UX¯ ∈ CM¯×M¯ and ΛX¯ ∈ CM¯×M¯ denoting a unitary matrix and a
diagonal matrix that stem from the SVD of X¯ = UX¯ΛX¯V
H
X¯
, respectively, Q ∈ CM¯×M¯ is an i.d.
11
random unitary matrix that is independent of G¯X¯, and λG¯X¯,i is the i-th non-zero singular value
of G¯X¯.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In fact, the study on the differential entropy of YE in (11) is not new [19] [20]. Proposition
1 is however tailored for our purposes, because the input distribution is fixed to i.i.d. complex
Gaussian rather than the unitary matrix as is the case for non-secure communication systems.
In this proposition, we are also able to find a single compact expression of the non-coherent
differential entropy, which is applicable to all antenna configurations with T ≥ M¯ .
Lemma 2: When G¯ follows Properties 1 and 2, h(GˆΛX¯Q) in (12) is bounded by
NE(K log pieα
2 +NJ log pieβ
2) +NE
M¯∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
≤ h(GˆΛX¯Q) ≤ M¯NE log pieT, (13)
where ϕ(·) denotes the digamma function.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Combining the results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, we can establish the upper and lower
bounds of h(YE). For example, provided that K +NJ = M and α
2 = β2 = 1, the gap between
the bounds in (13) reduces to
MNE log T −NE
M∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
T→∞
= NE
(
M log T −
M∑
i=1
log(T − i+ 1)
)
, (14)
where the approximation holds due to the fact that lima→∞ ϕ(a) = ln a. From (14), the gap
will become smaller as the coherence time T increases. Therefore, the bounds in (13) are
asymptotically tight for T ≫ M . Note that the tightness is always preserved in terms of the
DoF in (12) regardless of T .
Now, to compute h(YE |S), let us rewrite YE in (5) as
YTE = N
TGT2 + S
TGT1 + Z
T.
Then, the system can be interpreted as the fictitious case of the BS sending a virtual signal
matrix GT2 through a random propagation matrix N
T with effective noise STGT1 + Z
T. For a
12
given S, each column of the effective noise has an equal covariance matrix α2STS∗ + σ2zIT .
Thus, we can perform the noise whitening as
Y¯TE , σz(α
2STS∗ + σ2zIT )
− 1
2YTE
d
= σz(α
2STS∗ + σ2zIT )
− 1
2NTGT2 + Z
T, (15)
where the second equality holds true, because σz(α
2STS∗ + σ2zIT )
− 1
2 (STGT1 + Z
T)
d
= ZT.
In the meantime, let us define the eigenvalue decomposition of STS∗ as
STS∗ = VS
[
Λ2S 0
0 0
]
VHS
where ΛS = diag{λS,1, . . . , λS,K} ∈ CK×K represents a diagonal matrix containing non-zero
singular values of S and VS , [VS1 VS2] ∈ CT×T is a unitary matrix with VS1 ∈ CT×K and
VS2 ∈ CT×(T−K). Now, applying the above decomposition to (15), it follows that
Y¯TE
d
= VS
[
σz(αΛS)
−1 0
0 IT−K
]
VHSN
TGT2 + Z
T
= VS2V
H
S2
NTGT2 + σzVS1(αΛS)
−1VHS1N
TGT2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ZT. (16)
We observe that the resulting sum of (a) has rank NJ , while the rank of VS2V
H
S2
NTGT2 equals
min(T − K,NJ). Therefore as long as T − K ≥ NJ (i.e., T ≥ M¯ ), the second term of (16)
becomes negligible as σz → 0. In addition, as it is true that Y¯TE d= VHSY¯TE , we have
Y¯TE
d
=
[
ZT1
NT2G
T
2 + Z
T
2
]
, (17)
where Z1 = ZV
∗
S1
∈ CNE×K and Z2 = ZV∗S2 ∈ CNE×(T−K) have i.i.d CN (0, σ2z) entries, and
the components of N2 = NV
∗
S2
∈ CNJ×(T−K) are i.i.d CN (0, 1).
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The differential entropy h(YE|S) = h(YTE|S) is now computed by
h(YTE|S) = h(Y¯TE|S) +NEE
[
log det
(
α2STS∗ + σ2zIT
)]−NET log σ2z
= h(Z1) + h(G2N2 + Z2) +NEE
[
log det
(
α2STS∗ + σ2zIT
)]−NET log σ2z
= h(G2N2 + Z2) +KNE log pieσ
2
z +NEE
[
K∑
i=1
log(α2λ2S,i)
]
+NE(T −K) log σ2z −NET log σ2z
= h(G2N2 + Z2) +NEE
[
K∑
i=1
log λ2S,i
]
+KNE log pieα
2 (18)
where the first equality holds from the entropy scaling law h(Ax|A) = h(x)+E[log det(AAH)]
for a square full-rank matrix A. Finally, applying Proposition 1 to h(G2N2 + Z2), we obtain
h(YE|S) as summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Define YE = G1S + G2N + Z, where G1 ∈ CNE×K , G2 ∈ CNE×NJ , and
Z ∈ CNE×T have i.i.d. complex Gaussian entries with zero mean and variances α2, β2, and
σ2z , respectively, and the entries of S ∈ CK×T , N ∈ CNJ×T are i.i.d CN (0, 1). Also, we define
N2 ∈ CNJ×(T−K) as a matrix that consists of the last T −K columns of N.
Then, for T ≥ M¯ , the conditional entropy h(YE |S) is computed at high SNRE (σ2z → 0) as
h(YE|S) = h(Gˆ2ΛN2Q) + (T − M¯)E

min(NJ ,NE)∑
i=1
log λ2G2N2,i


+NE
K∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e + log
∣∣G(T −K,min(NJ , NE))∣∣∣∣G(max(NJ , NE), NE)∣∣ +KNE log pieα2
+(NE −NJ)+(T − M¯) log pieσ2z + o(1), (19)
where Gˆ2 , G2UN2 with UN2 ∈ CNJ×NJ and ΛN2 ∈ CNJ×NJ denoting a unitary matrix and
a diagonal matrix that stem from the SVD of N2 = UN2ΛN2V
H
N2
, respectively, Q ∈ CNJ×NJ
is an i.d. random unitary matrix that is independent of G2N2, and λG2N2,i is the i-th non-zero
singular value of G2N2.
Following the proof in Lemma 2, h(Gˆ2ΛN2Q) in (19) is bounded by
NENJ log pieβ
2 +NE
NJ∑
i=1
ϕ(T −K − i+ 1) log e
≤ h(Gˆ2ΛN2Q) ≤ NENJ log pie(T −K). (20)
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Finally, by combining Propositions 1 and 2, we can evaluate the high SNR approximate to the
non-coherent leakage rate as summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Non-coherent Leakage Rate): When the effective ED channels of both G1 and
G2 are unknown to the ED with T ≥ M¯ , the non-coherent leakage rate is computed at high
SNRE (σ
2
z → 0) as
Lnon-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ) = min((NE −NJ)+, K)
(
1− M¯
T
)
log SNRE
+ cK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh + o(1),
where cK,NE ,NJ ,T,non-coh is defined and bounded by
cK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh ,
1
T
h(GˆΛX¯Q)−
1
T
h(Gˆ2ΛN2Q) + dK,NE ,NJ ,T,non-coh
≤ NE
T
{
K log pieT +NJ log
T
β2
−
M¯∑
i=K+1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
}
+ dK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh,
and cK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh ≥
NE
T
{
K log pieα2 +NJ log
β2
T −K +
M¯∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
}
+ dK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh
with dK,NE,NJ ,T,non-coh ,
(
1− M¯
T
)
E
[
log
∏min(M¯,NE)
i=1 λ
2
G¯X¯,i∏min(NJ ,NE)
i=1 λ
2
G2N2,i
]
−NE
T
K∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e+ 1
T
log
{ ∣∣G(T,min(M¯,NE))∣∣∣∣G(max(M¯,NE), NE)∣∣
∣∣G(max(NJ , NE), NE)∣∣∣∣G(T −K,min(NJ , NE))∣∣
}
−min((NE −NJ)+, K)
(
1− M¯
T
)
log pie− KNE
T
log pieα2.
Note that the bounds (21) and (21) in Theorem 1 are based on the results in (13) and (20).
Focusing on the DoF, it is interesting to contrast the ergodic leakage rate in Lemma 1 and the
non-coherent leakage rate in Theorem 1. As mentioned previously, the ergodic leakage rate is
independent of the coherence time T , because the ED can exploit its full spatial DoF by using
the CSIs. Therefore, a large number of ED antennas may be a security threat. On the contrary,
the result in Theorem 1 reveals that the channel uncertainty reduces the ED’s spatial DoF by
the factor of (1 − M¯
T
). This is because some of the space-time dimension of the ED channel
should be consumed for channel uncertainty resolution. Interestingly, if the BS increases the AN
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signal space dimension NJ such that M¯ = T or more, we achieve a zero DoF in the leakage
rate regardless of the number of ED antennas NE . Therefore, the proposed ANAM having a
large number of transmit antennas with no downlink training is inherently robust to the passive
eavesdropping especially in a mobile environment where the coherence time T is not too long.
Now, we investigate the constant value of the leakage rate in Theorem 1. Let us consider an
example of M¯ = M = T and α2 = β2 = 1. In this case, the DoF equals zero, and thus the
leakage rate upperbound is saturated to a constant value at high SNRE as
Lnon-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ) ≤ NE log T − NE
T
{
M¯∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
}
,
≤ NE log eγT
where γ ≃ 0.57721566 denotes the Euler’s constant. We see that compared to the LUs’ data
rate at high SNR, the effect of a large antenna attack of the ED could be marginal even with
respect to the constant values of the leakage rate. The above bound is also independent of K,
which means that the increase of the number of LUs does not affect the amount of leakage to
the ED. An interesting point here is that we did not assume any wiretap codes or the CSI of the
ED channels at the BS, both of which are practically difficult to realize. Therefore, the ANAM
is also of practical significance and has the potential of physical layer security.
V. PARTIALLY COHERENT LEAKAGE RATE
In this section, we consider a practical situation where the BS transmits the downlink training
precoded by H† to the LUs. This is in fact useful when the knowledge of H at the BS is
imperfect or outdated and therefore the LUs needs to estimate their effective channels more
accurately. However, the downlink training may also give the ED a chance of estimating its
own effective channel G1. Therefore, it is also practically of interest to investigate the partially
coherent leakage rate supposing that the effective ED channel G1 is known to the ED whereas
the AN channel G2 is still unknown.
In order to estimate the fading coefficients of the K different LUs, a training phase of duration
should be no smaller than K [29]. This represents the minimum cost for using the downlink
training to the LUs, which reduces the effective coherence time for the data transmission from
T to T ′ ≤ T −K. Thus, with the downlink training, the leakage rate can be formulated by
Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′) = 1
T ′
I(Y′E ;S′|G1) (21)
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where Y′E = G1S
′ + G2N′ + Z′ ∈ CNE×T ′ denotes the received signals at the ED over the
remaining coherence time T ′ with an input signal matrices S′ ∈ CK×T ′ (message signals) and
N′ ∈ CNJ×T ′ (AN signals) both having i.i.d. CN (0, 1) entries, and an additive noise Z′ ∈ CNE×T ′
having i.i.d. CN (0, σ2z) entries. As a worst case, we consider no channel estimation error at the
ED. Nevertheless, a direct evaluation of (21) is difficult due to the hidden variables in G2. To
tackle the problem, we first investigate a universal upperbound that generally holds without any
assumption. Then, we obtain tighter upper and lower bounds under the assumption that NE ≥ M¯ ,
T ′ ≫ NJ , and σ2z → 0.
A. Universal upperbound
The following theorem evaluates the universal upperbound of the partially coherent leakage
rate in (21).
Theorem 2: Supposing that the ED perfectly knowsG1 (notG2), the partially coherent leakage
rate to the ED is universally upperbounded by
Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′) ≤ 1
T ′
I(Y′E ;S′,G2, |G1,N′)−
1
T ′
I(Y′E ;G2|N′,G1,S′) (22)
= min(NE, K)
(
1− NJ
T ′
)+
log SNRE + c
univ
K,NE,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh
(23)
where cunivK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh represents the terms that converges to a constant at high SNRE as
cunivK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh =
1
T ′
E
[min(T ′,NJ )∑
i=1
min(NE ,K)∑
j=1
log
{
1 +
λ2G1,j
β2λ2N ′,i + σ
2
z
}]
+
(
1− NJ
T ′
)+
E
[min(NE ,K)∑
j=1
log(λ2G1,j + σ
2
z)
]
.
with λN ′,i for i = 1, . . . ,min(T
′, NJ) and λG1,j for j = 1, . . . ,min(NE , K) denoting the non-zero
singular values of N′ and G1, respectively, which is tight in the low SNRE region.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Corollary 1: At low SNRE , the partially coherent leakage rate asymptotically equals
Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′) σ
2
z→∞= E
[
log
(
IK + SNREG
H
1G1
)]
, (24)
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Proof: Assuming that σ2z →∞, we have
cunivK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh
σ2z→∞= min(NE , K)
(
1− NJ
T ′
)+
log σ2z
+
{min(T ′, NJ)
T ′
+
(
1− NJ
T ′
)+}
E
[min(NE ,K)∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
λ2G1,j
σ2z
)]
, (25)
which leads to Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′)
σ2z→∞≤ E[∑min(NE ,K)j=1 log (1+ λ2G1,jσ2z )]. Since the universal
bound in Theorem 2 is tight, we obtain the corollary.
The results in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 provide useful insight into the system. First, observe
that at low SNRE, the partially coherent leakage rate converges to the ergodic capacity of the ED
channel with no AN, which implies that there may be no security gain that stems from the AN
and its channel uncertainty. In contrast, the universal bound in (23) shows that for the case of
σ2z <∞, the AN and its channel uncertainty are still valid for emasculating the ED’s decoding
ability even if G1 is known to the ED, since we can arbitrarily reduce (23) by increasing β
2 or
decreasing T . Note that obviously the known CSI G1 is beneficial for the ED to intercept the
messages compared to the non-coherent cases. Thus, the bounds introduced in Theorem 2 can
also be exploited as useful upperbound for the non-coherent leakage rate Lnoncoherent(K,NE, NJ)
in the previous section.
B. Tight upper and lower bounds with high SNR approximation
In this subsection, we investigate tighter upper and lower bounds for the partially coherent
leakage rate based on the high SNR approximation. By definition, we have
Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′) = 1
T ′
h(Y′E|G1)−
1
T ′
h(Y′E|G1,S′)
=
1
T ′
h(Y′E|G1)−
1
T ′
h(G2N
′ + Z′) (26)
Then, the high SNR approximate to the first and second terms of (26) can be attained following
the arguments in Theorem 1 and 2, respectively. The result is summarized below. Detailed proof
is omitted here for brevity.
Theorem 3 (Coherent Leakage Rate): Define G2,2 ∈ C(NE−K)×NJ as a random matrix having
i.i.d CN (0, β2) entries. Then, Supposing that G1 is known to the ED with NE ≥ M¯ , T ′ ≥ NJ ,
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and σ2z → 0, the partially coherent leakage rate can be evaluated by
Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′) = K
(
1− NJ
T ′
)+
log SNRE + cK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh + o(1)
where cK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh denotes the constant terms irrespective of SNRE, which is defined and
bounded by
cK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh ,
1
T ′
h(G2,2UN ′ΛN ′Q)− 1
T ′
h(G2UN ′ΛN ′Q) + dK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh
≤ 1
T ′
{
NJNE log T
′ −KNJ log pieT ′β2 −NE
NJ∑
i=1
ϕ(T ′ − i+ 1) log e
}
+ dK,NE,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh,
cK,NE ,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh ≥
1
T ′
{
(NE −K)
NJ∑
i=1
ϕ(T ′ − i+ 1) log e−NENJ log T ′ −KNJ log pieβ2
}
+ dK,NE,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh,
with dK,NE,NJ ,T ′,partial-coh ,
(
1− NJ
T ′
)( NJ∑
i=1
E
[
log
λ2G2,2N ′,i
λ2G2N ′,i
]
−K log pie
)
+
K∑
i=1
ϕ(NE − i+ 1) log e+K log pieα2.
The result in Theorem 3 shows the exact DoF of the partially coherent leakage rate, from
which we recognize that the universal bound in Theorem 2 is tight in terms of the DoF for the
case of NE ≥ M¯ , but otherwise it may be loose especially at high SNRE . A zero-DoF condition
NJ ≥ T ′ arises from Theorem 3. Interestingly, for T ′ = T −K, it is equivalently M¯ ≥ T which
is the same condition for the non-coherent ED. By combining the results in Theorem 2 and 3,
one may also find a tighter upperbound by taking the minimum of them, but details are omitted
for brevity.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we introduce useful design methods for the ANAM systems by leveraging the
proposed analysis on the leakage rates. To this end, we assume that the BS has an access at least
to the statistical information of the ED channels such as the distribution, the ED’s location, and
the doppler frequency. Note that the instantaneous CSIs of the ED channels are still unknown
to the BS.
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A. How many antennas do we need at the BS for secrecy?
In practice, a popular rule of thumb for determining the coherence time Tc in modern digital
communications is Tc ≃ 0.423fm (sec) where fm(Hz) denotes the maximum doppler frequency.
In LTE-A, for example, one OFDM symbol duration is about 72.4µs, which implies that the
coherence symbol length T of the ED’s channels in LTE-A is approximately computed by
T =
Tc
72.4µs
=
5842.5
fm
, (27)
where we have fm =
vfc
c
for carrier frequency fc(Hz), speed of a moving object v(m/s), and
speed of light c = 3× 108(m/s).
With the knowledge on the doppler frequency of the ED channels, the BS may determine its
number of antennas such that M =
⌈
5842.5
fm
⌉
to achieve the zero-DoF leakage rate. Obviously as
the ED’s mobility v or the carrier frequency fc increases, the required number of BS antennas
will decrease. For example, for [fc = 5 GHz, v = 0.8 m/s] and [fc = 10 GHz, v = 1.3 m/s], the
BS may need M = 351 and 135 number of antennas, respectively, both of which are reasonable
numbers from the massive MIMO point of view.3
B. Artificially fast faded AN
When the coherence time of the ED channels is measured too long, we can deliberately
randomize the artificial noise channel G2 by reformulating the transmit signal in (1) as
X = αH†S+ βV¯H2,NJA(t)N, (28)
where A(t) denotes the AFF precoder that randomly changes in each time instant t within the
coherence time. Then, the received signal at Eve can be expressed by
YE = G1S+G2(t)N+ Z, (29)
where G2(t) , G2A(t). Observe that as the changing period of A(t) becomes shorter, the
effective coherence time of G2(t) reduces, and therefore we obtain an enhanced security.
3We note that in the practical wireless channels, the coherence time should be finite even if the ED’s mobility equals zero,
because the channel variation is also affected by the weather or moving obstacles around the ED. It is also possible to intentionally
change the ED’s channel by installing shielding plates or moving obstacles around the BS antennas. Such channel variations
also can be effectively modeled by a doppler frequency of the ED channel.
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A major difference point of (28) from the existing AFF schemes in [15] and [16] is that we
apply the AFF precoder to the artificial noise signal N, not to the data signal S. The reason is
that the AFF precoder applied to the data signal S may be cost ineffective because it requires an
additional effort to make the LU channels deterministic, which reduces the randomness of the ED
channels [18]. In contrast, the AFF precoder in (28) does not require the channel constantization
process, because the AN will not appear in the LU channels. In addition, as shown in Section
V, the short coherence time of G2(t) may significantly degrade the ED’s decoding ability even
if G1 is perfectly known to the ED. Therefore, the proposed AFF precoding in (28) is indeed
effective. Unfortunately, however, a rigorous analysis for the leakage-rate is unviable yet because
independence between two fading channel matricesG2(t) andG2(t
′) for t 6= t′ is not guaranteed,
and may be discussed in our future works.
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
With a knowledge on the ED’s channel statistics at the BS, it is also of interest to investigate
the secrecy rate that specifies the secure data rate to the LUs with the aid of the wiretap codes at
the BS.4 In general, the achievable secrecy rate is computed by the difference of the information
rate to the LUs and the leakage rate to the ED for a given input distribution [13]. In what
follows, we consider two scenarios, a single LU having K antennas and K LUs each having a
single antenna. Note that the achievable secrecy rates are obtained based on the leakage rates
upperbounds in Theorems 1 and 3 rather than the lowerbounds.
1) Single-user secrecy rate: For the case of a single LU with K antennas, the wiretap code
can be applied across the K different data streams, because we have only one message to encode.
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate with non-coherent ED is simply given by
Rsec,non-coh =
[
K log
(
1 +Mα2SNRL
)−Lnon-coh(K,NE, NJ , T )]+ . (30)
As for the partially coherent ED, the data transmission takes place over T ′ symbol times
during the coherent time T due to the downlink training phase. Therefore, the secrecy rate is
4In general, the wiretap code requires the BS to know the ED’s CSI to compute the leakage rate I(S;YE) since it is needed
to determine the amount of the confusing codewords in each message bin [13] [14]. In our cases, the leakage rate can be
evaluated based on the statistical information of the ED channels without needing to know their instantaneous values, and thus
the secrecy-rate is also a valid metric. The interested readers may refer to [2], [17], [30] for other cases of the secrecy rate
being investigated without the ED’s CSI at the transmitter
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Fig. 2. Leakage rate performance according to various coherence time T = γM with SNRE = 30 dB.
computed as
Rsec,partial-coh =
T ′
T
[
K log
(
1 +Mα2SNRL
)− Lpartial-coh(K,NE, NJ , T ′)]+ . (31)
2) Multi-user secrecy rate: For the case of multiple K LUs with a single antenna, the wiretap
code must be applied independently to each data stream, because otherwise the encoded data
may not be decodable at each LU. A reasonable approach in this case is to consider the worst
case scenario where the ED can intercept all other messages Mi, ∀i 6= k when we encode the
message for the k-th user. Thus, the achievable non-coherent and partially coherent secrecy-rates
to the K LUs are respectively computed as
Rsec,non-coh = K
[
log
(
1 +Mα2SNRL
)− Lnon-coh(1, NE, NJ , T )]+
and Rsec,partial-coh =
KT ′
T
[
log
(
1 +Mα2SNRL
)− Lpartial-coh(1, NE, NJ , T ′)]+ , (32)
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the leakage and secrecy rate performance of the ANAM systems
through numerical examples and we provide useful observations. Throughout the section, we
focus on a system with M = 64, K = 16, and α = β = 1 unless stated otherwise, but the result
can be generally applied to other simulation environments. As illustrated in Figure 1, we assume
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Fig. 3. Leakage rate performance according to various NE and NJ with T = 5M and SNRE = 30 dB.
that the distributions of the ED channels G1 and G2 follow Properties 1 and 2. In addition, the
effective coherence time for the partially coherent scenario equals T ′ = T −K.
Figure 2 compares the leakage rate performance for various CSI situations at the ED in the
ANAM systems with NE = 64, NJ = 48, SNRE = 30 dB, and T = γM for γ ≥ 1. Here,
“Ergodic Leakage” indicates the ergodic leakage rate in Lemma 1 for the coherent ED, which
amounts to the worst case in terms of security, and “UB” and “LB” denote the proposed upper
and lower bounds of the leakage rates. It is seen that as the coherence time T increases, both the
partially-coherent and non-coherent leakage rates approach their full CSI counter part. This is
because a large coherence time may give enough time for the ED to perform the blind detection
[11] [12]. The figure also confirms our statement in equation (14) that as the coherence time
increases, the gap between the leakage rate bounds reduces. In most cases, the bounds are tight
when T > 5M , at which we can estimate the exact amount of leakage to the ED. The partially
coherent leakage is slightly higher than the non-coherent one due to G1 known at ED.
Figure 3 shows the leakage rate performance according to various NE and NJ with T = 5M
and SNRE = 30 dB. Note that for the case of NJ = 0, we set α =
√
M/K. As observed in
[7], when M ≫ NE, the ED’s decoding ability keeps small regardless of the AN and CSI at the
ED. However, as NE gets larger to be compared with M , the AN becomes essential to disrupt
the ED. One interesting observation is that the coherent ED manages the AN better than the
non-coherent ED especially when NE > M , which verifies the robustness of the ANAM system
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Fig. 5. Leakage rate performance in the low SNRE regime with T = M and various NE .
to the large antenna array attacks from the ED.
Figure 4 exhibits the partially coherent leakage-rate bounds according to various SNRE and T
with NE = 64 and NJ = 48. First, we verify that the AN channel uncertainty at the ED degrades
its DoF by the factor of (1−NJ/T ′)+ compared to the ergodic leakage rate. Also, it is confirmed
again that the proposed bounds are tight over the SNRs for T > 5M . In contrast, if T keeps
decreasing towards M , the bounds may be loose. Nevertheless, the information leakage effect
will be reduced at high SNR, because in this case the leakage-rate DoF gradually disappears.
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T = 2M .
Figure 5 shows the low SNR behavior of the universal leakage-rate upperbound with NJ = 48,
T = M , and NE = 64. We confirm that when SNRE is sufficiently small, the universal bound
exhibits the same behavior as the ergodic leakage rate. This is because the AN is relatively
ignorable at low SNRE . On the contrary, as SNRE increases, the universal bound will be saturated
by means of the AN and ED’s channel uncertainty on G2. Note that the performance of the
universal bound presented in this figure is also helpful to predict the low SNR behavior of the
non-coherent leakage rates as well as the partially coherent one.
Figure 6 illustrates the achievable secrecy rate to a single LU with K antennas in the ANAM
system with NJ = 48, T = 2M , and SNRE = SNRL = SNR. For all NE , the LUs with the non-
coherent ED can enjoy higher secrecy rate over those with the partially coherent ED, because
the former does not pay for the downlink training. On the other hand, the LUs with the partially
coherent ED achieves an improved secrecy-rate compared to the case of the coherent ED due
to the unknown CSI on G2 and the limited coherence time T . This confirms our statement in
Section VI-B that the AFF scheme which randomizes G2 will further mitigates the leakage-rate
by reducing the effective coherence time T . It is also interesting to observe that both the partially
coherent and non-coherent secrecy-rates continuously grow with SNR regardless of NE , whereas
the ergodic secrecy-rate even vanishes as NE increases from 64 to 128.
In Figure 7, we investigate the tendency of the secrecy-rate change according to the coherence
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time T = γM with NJ = 48, SNRE = SNRL = 30 dB. We observe that the smaller the ED’s
channel coherence time is, the higher the achievable secrecy-rate becomes. As illustrated in
Section VI-A, the coherent time T = 2M amounts to the ED’s mobility 1.3 km/h in the carrier
frequency of fc = 10 GHz in LTE-A, which implies that a small movement of the ED or a slight
environmental change around the ED may produce a high security gain in the ANAM systems.
Figure 8 compares the performance of single-user and multi-user secrecy rates with NJ =
48, T = 7M , and SNRE = SNRL. As explained in Section VI-C2, the single-user secrecy-
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rate outperforms the multi-user secrecy-rate, because each encoding function for multiple LUs
considers a genie aided ED that is more capable than the one for the single-user case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the leakage-rate performance of the ANAM systems with a
non-coherent passive ED in block fading, where CSI of the ED channels are unknown to both the
BS and the ED. First, we analyzed tight upper and lower bounds of the non-coherent leakage rate
with the high SNR approximation. Then, we derived the leakage rate to the coherent ED with
partial CSI considering a situation in which the BS transmits the precoded downlink training.
We also computed single- and multi-user secrecy rates that are attainable via appropriate wiretap
codes at the BS. From our analysis, it was found that the conventional assumption on the full
CSI ED may be too pessimistic to provide meaningful information on the security, because the
channel uncertainty at the ED may significantly degrade the ED’s message interception ability.
Finally, the numerical results demonstrated that our analysis is accurate and the derived bounds
are tight as the coherence time is relatively larger than the number of BS antennas.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Note that in this proof, we basically assume that M ≤ T . Let us define SVD of YE =
UEΛEV
H
E where UE ∈ CNE×Ω and VE ∈ CT×Ω are unitary matrices and ΛE ∈ CΩ×Ω denotes
a diagonal matrix having Ω , min(NE , T ) non-zero singular values of YE ordered in descending
order, i.e., {σ1, . . . , σΩ} on its main diagonal. Also, observe that YE is i.d., since it’s distribution
is invariant over both left and right unitary transformations, which means that the singular vectors
of YE are i.d and independent of the singular values. Thus, by the SVD coordinate change [31],
we write
h(YE) = h(UE) + h(VE) + h(σ1, . . . , σΩ) + E[log |JΩ′,Ω(σ1, . . . , σΩ)|]
= log |S(NE,Ω)|+ log |S(T,Ω)|+ h(σ1, . . . , σΩ) + E[log |JΩ′,Ω(σ1, . . . , σΩ)|],
where Ω′ , max(T,NE) and JΩ′,Ω(·) denotes the Jacobian that is induced by the change of
SVD coordinate, which is defined by
JΩ′,Ω(σ1, . . . , σΩ) ,
∏
i<j
(σ2i − σ2j )2
Ω∏
i=1
σ
2(Ω′−Ω)+1
i .
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Now, the remaining problem is to find the differential entropy of the singular values of YE.
To this end, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For the singular values of YE with G¯X¯ having rank Ξ , min(NE, M¯), the
following property holds as σ2z → 0,
{σ1, . . . , σΞ} d→ {µ1, . . . , µΞ}
and {σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ} d→ {µΞ+1, . . . , µΩ}
where {µ1, . . . , µΞ} and {µΞ+1, . . . , µΩ} are the singular values of G¯X¯ and an independent
(NE − Ξ)× (T − Ξ) matrix Z¯ having i.i.d. CN (0, σ2z) entries, respectively.
Proof: The proof is similar to [20, Lemma 16]. However, the result in [20, Lemma 16] is
restricted to the cases of NE > M¯ and a specific form of input signal X¯. Here, we provide a
refined proof that holds for general NE and any matrix G¯X¯ that is independent of Z.
By the circular symmetry of the noise matrix Z, the singular values of YE has the same
distribution with those of
Y0 =
[
D 0
0 0
]
+
[
Z11 Z11
Z21 Z22
]
where D ∈ RΞ×Ξ denotes the non-zero singular value matrix of G¯X¯, and Z1 ∈ CΞ×Ξ, Z2 ∈
CΞ×(T−Ξ), and Z3 ∈ C(NE−Ξ)×(T−Ξ) represents random matrices having i.i.d. CN (0, σ2z) entries.
Now, consider an equation f(λ) = det(λINE − Y0YH0 ) with the roots (σ21 , . . . , σ2NE). Then, it
can be simplified at high SNRE as
f(λ)
σ→0
= det
([
λIΞ −D2 −DZH21
−ZH21D λINE−Ξ − Z21ZH21 − Z22ZH22
])
= det(λIΞ −D2) det(λNE−Ξ − Z22ZH22 − Z21ZH21 + Z21D(D2 − λΞ)−1DZH21, (33)
where the second equality follows from the Schur’s identity for determinant of a block matrix.
To find the roots of f(λ) = 0, we observe that the first Ξ roots are the entries in D2. The
remaining NE − Ξ eigenvalues are thus order of σ2z , which means that they are much smaller
than the entries of D. We can approximate (D2 − λIΞ) as D2, i.e., the second determinant of
(33) becomes det(λIΞ−NE − Z22ZH22). Therefore, the remaining NE − Ξ eigenvalues of Y0Y0
are approximately the eigenvalues of Z22Z
H
22, and the proof is completed.
Lemma 3 states that the two sets of singular values {σ1, . . . , σΞ} and {σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ} of YE
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are asymptotically independent of each other. Thus, we have
h(YE) = log |S(NE,Ω)|+ log |S(T,Ω)|+ h(σ1, . . . , σΞ) + h(σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ)
+E[log |JΩ′,Ω(σ1, . . . , σΩ)|]. (34)
Note that the singular values of G¯X¯ and GˆΛX¯ are the same. Also, a matrix GˆΛX¯Q is i.d.,
since Q is independent of G¯X¯. Thus, we can consider the following differential entropy via the
SVD coordinate change as
h(GˆΛX¯Q) = log |S(NE,Ξ)|+ log |S(M¯,Ξ)|+ h(σ1, . . . , σΞ)
+E[log |JΞ′,Ξ(σ1, . . . , σΞ)|], (35)
where Ξ′ , max(NE , M¯). Also, we write
h(Z¯) = (NE − Ξ)+(T − Ξ) log pieσ2z
= log |S(Ω− Ξ,Ω− Ξ)|+ log |S(Ω′ − Ξ,Ω− Ξ)|+ h(σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ)
+E[log |JΩ′−Ξ,Ω−Ξ(σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ)|]. (36)
where the second equality follows from the SVD coordinate change of Z¯. Then, combining the
three equations from (34) to (36), we get
h(YE) = h(GˆΛX¯Q) + (NE − Ξ)+(T − Ξ) log pieσ2z
+E[log |JΩ′,Ω(σ1, . . . , σΩ)|]− E[log |JΞ′,Ξ(σ1, . . . , σΞ)|]
−E[log |JΩ′−Ξ,Ω−Ξ(σΞ+1, . . . , σΩ)|]
+ log |S(NE,Ω)|+ log |S(T,Ω)| − log |S(NE,Ξ)| − log |S(M¯,Ξ)|
− log |S(Ω− Ξ,Ω− Ξ)| − log |S(Ω′ − Ξ,Ω− Ξ)|. (37)
First, for NE ≤ M¯ , it follows that
h(YE) = h(GˆΛX¯Q) + E[log |JT,NE(σ1, . . . , σNE)|]− E[log |JM¯,NE(σ1, . . . , σNE)|]
+ log |S(T,NE)| − log |S(M¯,NE)|
= h(GˆΛX¯Q) + log
|G(T,NE)|
|G(M¯,NE)| +
NE∑
i=1
E
[
log σ
2(T−NE)+1
i − log σ2(M¯−NE)+1i
]
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= h(GˆΛX¯Q) + log
|G(T,NE)|
|G(M¯,NE)| + (T − M¯)E
[
NE∑
i=1
log σ2i
]
. (38)
Similarly, for NE > M¯ , we can show that
h(YE) = h(GˆΛX¯Q) + (NE − M¯)+(T − M¯) log pieσ2z
+ log |G(T, M¯)|+ (T − M¯)E
[
M¯∑
i=1
log σ2i
]
. (39)
Finally, combining (38) and (39), we obtain Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
By Properties 1 and 2, we have E[Tr(G¯UX¯Λ
2
X¯
UH
X¯
G¯H ] = E[Tr(G¯X¯X¯HG¯H)] = TNE(α
2K +
β2NJ) = TNEM where the last equality stems from the power constraint in (9). Thus, the
differential entropy h(GˆΛX¯Q) is maximized by the NE×M¯ matrix with i.i.d. CN (0, T ) entries
as h(GˆΛX¯Q) ≤ M¯NE log pieT .
Now, the lower bound can be computed as
h(GˆΛX¯Q) ≥ h(G¯UX¯ΛX¯Q|X¯,Q)
= h(G¯) +NEE
[
log det
(
X¯X¯H
)]
= NE(K log pieα
2 +NJ log pieβ
2) +NE
M¯∑
i=1
ϕ(T − i+ 1) log e
where the last equality follows from Definition 3, and the proof is completed.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
For the proof, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For the given Y′E in (21), we obtain the following inequality
I(Y′E ;N′|G1) < I(Y′E ;N′|G1,S′) (40)
which is tight as σ2z →∞.
Proof: First, observe that I(Y′E ;N′|G1) amounts to a fictitious case of the BS sending the
signal N to the ED with the effective additive noise G1S
′ + Z′ where G1 is known to the ED.
Therefore, the leakage rate will further increase if the ED knows both G1 and S
′ because in this
case the noise reduces to Z, which is the case of I(Y′E ;N′|G1,S′). When σz → ∞, G1S′ is
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ignorable relative to Z, which implies that I(Y′E ;N′|G1) ≃ I(Y′E;N′|G1,S′). Therefore, the
bound in (41) is tight in the low SNRE regime.
Now, based on Lemma 4, one can verify the following inequality as
I(Y′E ;S′|G1) = I(Y′E;S′,G2,N′|G1)− I(Y′E ;G2,N′|G1,S′)
= I(Y′E;S′,G2, |G1,N′)− I(Y′E ;G2|N′,G1,S′)
+I(Y′E;N′|G1)− I(Y′E;N′|G1,S′)
≤ I(Y′E;S′,G2, |G1,N′)− I(Y′E ;G2|N′,G1,S′), (41)
where the first two equalities follow from the chain rules and the last inequality stems from
Lemma 4, and thus is tight at low SNRE.
The right-hand side of (41) can be evaluated as in the following. First, we consider that
I(Y′E ;G2|N′,G1,S′) = I(N′TGT2 + Z′T;GT2 |N′) (42)
= NEE
[
log det
(
β2N′TN′∗ + σ2zIT ′
)]−NET ′ log σ2z (43)
= NE min(NJ , T
′) log SNRE +NEE
[min(NJ ,T ′)∑
i=1
log(β2λ2N ′,i + σ
2
z)
]
(44)
where the second equality is due to the fact that (42) represents a virtual MIMO channel where
a transmitter with NJ antennas sends the i.i.d. CN (0, β2) signals in GT2 during NE symbol times
through a random propagation matrix N′T that is known to the ED.
Next, the following properties are useful for further derivations.
Property 3: As for the Kronecker product, the following properties hold (A⊗B)(C⊗D) =
AC⊗BD and (A⊗B)H = AH ⊗BH.
Property 4: For two square matrices A ∈ Cp×p and B ∈ Cq×q, the Kronecker sum is defined
as A⊕B , A⊗ Iq + Ip ⊗B. Then, the (iq + j)-th eigenvalue of A⊕B equals a2i + b2j where
a2i and b
2
j denote the i-th and j-th eigenvalues of A and B, respectively.
Now, to evaluate I(Y′E ;S′,G2, |G1,N′) in (41), we write Y′E in the vectorization form as
vec(Y′E) = (IT ⊗G1)vec(S′) + (αN′T ⊗ INE)vec(G2/α) + vec(Z′)
= [IT ⊗G1 βN′T ⊗ INE ]

 vec(S′)
vec(G2/β)

+ vec(Z′)
where the components of S′ and G2/β are i.i.d. CN (0, 1). Then, utilizing the two properties
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above, we can verify the following equivalences
I(Y′E ;S′,G2|G1,N′) = I(vec(Y′E); vec(S′), vec(G2/β)|G1,N′)
= E
[
log det
(
(IT ′ ⊗G1GH1 ) + (β2N′TN′∗ ⊗ INE) + σ2zINET ′
)]−NET ′ log σ2z
= E
[
log det
(
(β2N′TN′∗ ⊕G1GH1 ) + σ2zINET ′
)]−NET ′ log σ2z . (45)
The rank of a kronecker sum β2NTN∗ ⊕ G1GH1 equals NET ′ − R from Property 4 where
R , (T ′ −NJ)+(NE −K)+ denotes the number of zero eigenvalues. Thus, we have
I(Y′E ;S′,G2|G1,N′)
= (NET
′ − R) log SNRE + E
[min(T ′,NJ )∑
i=1
min(NE ,K)∑
j=1
log(β2λ2N ′,i + λ
2
G1,j + σ
2
z)
]
+(NE −K)+E
[min(T ′,NJ)∑
i=1
log(β2λ2N ′,i + σ
2
z)
]
+ (T ′ −NJ)+E
[min(NE ,K)∑
j=1
log(λ2G1,j + σ
2
z)
]
.(46)
Finally, combining the results in (44) and (46), we obtain the theorem.
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